

P. 167 Sense of continuity + identity (self) bridges periods of unconsciousness + sleep. ... A great Polysomnogram + sensor - inputs the physical experience that we call the self in the physical world. - Re full + rapid - mental identity (more abstractly) P. 168 - But when - "within a few seconds not recognized as having patterned experience in sleep and time of our lowest infirmity. Ambiguity, with only a minute fraction, less than 1% of cerebral activity, - we begin to suspect a conscious existence. Pattern would be repeating it. - "I will refer mostly to showing attacks on big brains after the interesting ones on the divergent, over the human mind then to the most recent while in active studies over man on human being being assuming the scientific study of the right + left hemispheres after separation of their communicational connections, who study has been conducted out in the last few years in Los Angeles under the general direction of Roger Sperry.

P. 169 Investigations on the Human Brain after Commissural Section. - This work has been published and discussed on many occasions by Sperry and his colleagues (15-21), but it is my thesis that the extraordinary implications of this work for the mind-brain problem have not yet been fully realized by philosophers and scientists. This has occurred because the climate of opinion is not yet ready for these most surprising and revolutionary results. ~~The observations of~~ P. 170 These split-brain cases have been systematically investigated in a

Eccles, J.C.

Roman, Special and Consciousness

v

Dr. Naturwissenschaften, 60:167-176.

Department of Physiology, School of Medicine, State University of New York, Buffalo, New York.

Abstract: The language centers are restricted to the dominant cerebral hemisphere and are represented with special hypothetical areas. In a number of subjects the enormous circumference of the 2nd cerebral hemisphere was seen completely covered by these fields whereas only 1/3 of the hemisphere was involved in the associated disorganization. The outstanding discovery is the multiplicity and exclusivity of the cerebral hemisphere in respect of conscious experience. The higher brain functions are organized in a manner not subject to pattern and form but give the conscious experience to the subject. The higher than is described that merely the neural events in the manner brain phase are not directly give the subject any conscious experience. There is a really a discussion of the primacy of conditions in respect of cerebral function, both in seeing and in the the neuronal mechanisms of the brain area of the dominant hemisphere. A response is made to the numerous and much discussed problems that are involved in brain disorganization and primitive man developed means of communication & speech. -- 11

X
subject disclaims responsibility for these appropriate and intelligent actions programmed from his minor hemisphere. ((How can the left H. know what the right H. did, and how can the right H. claim responsibility if it can't talk!!!)) - (P.171) Poor transmission through subcortical pathways leads only to vague experience of discomfort or embarrassment the subject can not explain. (Eccles thinks that's surprising.) - I now formulate the radical hypothesis that, even before section of the corpus callosum, the "goings-on" in the minor hemisphere did not directly give the subject any conscious experiences, a hypothesis that I tentatively suggested several years ago. (28) Ref: to The Brain and the Unity of Conscious experience"(1965). In order to make this hypothesis of mind-brain interaction explicit I present a diagram (Fig. 7) that portrays the flow of communication between major subdivisions of the brain and also to and from the outside world. ((I think the same diagram is in "The Self and its Brain". It shows the mind outside the brain and interacting only with the left hemisphere.)) P.172 It is, of course, not implied that the conscious self is hovering in space above the dominant hemisphere. ... On this hypothesis we regard the minor hemisphere as having a status of a very superior animal brain. ... no conscious experience. Moreover, there is no evidence that this brain has some residual consciousness of its own. Sperry postulates that there is another mind in this brain, but it is prevented from communication with us because it has no speech. I would agree with this statement if it would be linked with the further statement that in this respect the minor hemisphere resembles an animal brain, though its performance is superior to that of the

P.170 (cont.) most skilled and patient manner by Sperry and his associates who have amassed a wealth of data that has been confirmed again and again in the sequence of patients. Great care has been exercised throughout the experimental design in order to eliminate all inadvertant cross-cueing. ... To me the outstanding discovery in the investigations is the uniqueness and exclusiveness of the dominant hemisphere, that is, the speech hemisphere, in respect to conscious experience. The friends and relative of the subject recognize his expression in language and his memory as being not greatly disturbed by the operation, despite the elimination of the whole performance of the right hemisphere. The unity of self-consciousness or the mental singleness that the patient experienced before the operation has been retained, but at the expense of unconsciousness of all the happenings in the minor hemisphere. This minor hemisphere continues to perform as a supremely intelligent animal brain with a refined stereognostic performance, but none of the goings-on in that hemisphere gives conscious experiences to the subject. It is remarkable to see the superior stereognostic performance programmed by the minor hemisphere to the left hand, all unbeknown to the subject who sees it with amazement and chagrin. ... In other respect, the minor hemisphere is deficient... (Word recognition is limited to names of common objects.) This recognition transcends a simple name-object identification in that it discloses a language comprehension, e.g. "measuring instrument" for ruler, "used for lighting fires" for match. In this manner the minor hemisphere can... (also)... display a simple learning in new situations. Despite all this apparently intelligent behavior, the subject never derives any conscious experiences from the "goings-on" in the minor hemisphere in all of its operative procedures. ((How does he know?)) In fact, as stated above, the

Various specific performances of the dominant and minor hemispheres as suggested by the new conceptual developments ~~by~~ of Levy-Agresti and Sperry. There are some additions to their original list:

Dominant Hemisphere:

Liaison to Consciousness
Verbal
Ideational
Analytic
Sequential
Arithmetical and
Computer-like

Minor Hemisphere:

No such liaison
Almost non-verbal
Musical
Pictorial and Pattern sense
Synthetic
Holistic
Geometrical and Spatial

← (Eccles added this one)

P.174 Reconsideration of the Mind-Brain Problem. Reference to Popper's 3 worlds.

P.175 The information flow diagram of fig. 7 can also form a background to the recent conceptual formulations of Sperry in mind-brain interaction. In general terms he states (Sperry R.W. in perception and its disorders, Res. Publ.Ass. Nerv. Ment. Dis. Vol.48 (1970) (Perception in the absence of the neocortical commissures.) : "Conscious phenomena in this

(P.172)(Cont.) highest anthropoids. In both of these cases we lack communication in a rich linguistic level, so it is not possible to test for the possibility of some consciously experiencing being. We therefore must be agnostic about the question of mental activities and consciousness in the manner in which I have defined it at the beginning. (E. makes much of the fact that even persons who are lefthanded are mostly left H. dominant, except when there was a braininjury to the left H. in early childhood.) --- (That's in P.169) --- P.173 again: Moreover, the most searching investigation discloses that the minor hemisphere does not have in the smallest degree this amazing property of being in liaison with the conscious mind of the subject in respect either of giving or receiving. ... Acute problem of what would happen if there is bilateral speech, as has been claimed to occur as a rare anomaly. ... Serafetinides showed that loss of consciousness (and aphasia) occurs for some minutes in the dominant hemisphere after sodium a... injections -- but only very shortly if the injection is administered to the minor hemisphere -- E. thinks that proves his hypothesis. (Results were criticized and are ^{irreproducible} ~~unrepeatable~~). More evidence needed. Loss of consciousness occurs only when both h. are affected. -- // Question: Is there some anatomical structure in the left H. that is not matched in the right H.? -- (Planum Temporale bigger on the left.) Finer diff. await electron-microscopic techniques. -- Speech in man unique. Developed rapidly during last 2 million years. No higher apes can speak. Communication at different level. Lower than right H. performance of Sperry's work. (One boy with birth defect in left H. could write correctly with left hand to right H. input, but could not say correctly what he wrote. Left H. had remained speech centre.)

in general with conscious experiences derived therefrom. In particular, sophisticated, intelligent and learned activities of the minor hemisphere do not achieve liaison to the consciousness of the subject. Moreover, as Sperry has realized, the problems have to be approached at a new level of understanding, the holistic approach. And this occurs in special regions only of the cerebral cortex and in special states of these regions. Moreover, psychoneural parallelism has to be rejected, for on this view the mental states are ineffective, being merely spin-offs of neural activities that they cannot influence. A further remarkable outcome of the split-brain investigations is that there is almost no cross-communication at the cerebral level except via the corpus callosum and the anterior and hippocampal commissures. The proposal by Penfield that mental unity is achieved by transmission to and from the centrencephalic system in the brain stem is, of course, falsified by the failure of any conscious appreciation of activities in the minor hemisphere after commissural transection. This unity must normally be achieved by the intense impulse flow through the cerebral commissures. Evidently immense and fundamental problems are involved in the evolution of the brain that occurred as man was gradually developing his means of communication in speech. One can imagine that speech and brain development went on together in the evolving process and that from these two emerged the the cultural performance of man. Over hundreds of millennia there must have been a progressive development of language from its primitive forms expressive cries to a language that became gradually a more and more effective means of description and argument.

scheme are conceived to interact with and to largely govern the physio-chemical and physiological aspects of the brain process. It obviously works the other way round as well, and thus a mutual interaction is conceived between the physiological and the mental properties. Even so, the present interpretation would tend to restore mind to its old prestigious position over matter, in the sense that the mental phenomena are seen to transcend the phenomena of physiology and biochemistry." ... "Consciousness does do things and is highly functional as an important component of the causal sequence in higher level actions. This is a view that puts consciousness to work. It gives the phenomena of consciousness a use and a reason for being and for having evolved. " ... In another publication he states: (Sperry, R.W. Psychol. Rev. 76, 532 (1969) - A modified concept of consciousness). "In the present scheme the author postulates that the conscious phenomena of subjective experience do interact on the brain processes exerting an active causal influence. In this view consciousness is conceived to have a directive role in determining the flow pattern of cerebral excitation." ... The split-brain investigations have, I think, falsified the psychoneural identity hypothesis, which has also been strongly attacked on philosophical grounds (Polton). It is demonstrated that the minor cerebral hemisphere with its ongoing activities that can be categorized as displaying memory, understanding even at a primitive verbal level, and concepts of spatial relations does not give any conscious experiences to the subject, who remains in conscious liaison only with neural events in the dominant hemisphere. Evidently, the concept of psychoneural identity has lost its primitive simplicity of identification of neural activities of the brain.

Sperry's Paradox

Eccles, J.C.

Brain, Speech, and Consciousness

- 5 -

1973

In this way, by forging linguistic communication of ever increasing precision and subtlety, man must gradually have become a self-conscious being aware of his own identity or selfhood. As a consequence, he also became aware of death, as witnessed so frequently and vividly in other members of the tribal group that he recognized as beings like himself. (At least a hundred thousand years ago - ceremonial burial customs.) ...development (P.176) of technology that distinguishes the Neolithic age from the relatively slow development of the long Paleolithic era. In the maturing civilizations the exigencies of survival were no longer dominant in the thoughts of men and the creative imagination of man could instead be expressed in literature, in art, in architecture, and in the further developments in religion, in philosophy and in science that are associated with his attempts to understand the manner of being he was, his origin, and his destiny.

Dr. Sperry believes Eccles took his downward - conscious concept of mind over + accelerated with it, after first knowing tried to relate conscious men to events in the organism. -- (1953) -- Sperry, he says, expanded the "unity of consciousness" already in his 1952 Paper + again in 1964 at the Vatican (where he met Eccles). -- Eccles only expressed it in 1963 --
I have to shade all the literature on that. --

be a means of deepening that insight into a living reality that
diff. methods, which were his characteristic aim. (That's still there +
Holland in the foreground.)

Eccles stands here (P.5) quoting

Edwin Guth: "In comparing the certainty of things spiritual

and things temporal, let us not forget this - Mind is the first and most direct thing in our
experience; all else is somewhat inferential. " -- and "Picture paint certainly was as a vehicle of
study, and it is not inferior to the picture again. (Carrington, 1911), not this
time as a bundle of sense impressions, but as the truth which by looking at it, the person
acquires, yearning, doubting, awakens in itself such impulses as these
which were the content of his great portrait. (Swanston, 1929) "Science
and the modern world." - P.6 But Edwin Guth was not alone among the great
physicists of this century in recognizing the importance of the mystery of the
problem of consciousness. (Schrödinger, Eugene Wigner,) --- P.7 mind, material,
materiality --- in some extremely familiar form and even articulated as being a
product of mind & matter in itself. (This against that.) --- P.9 --- "Thus we come to be-
lieve that there is a world of ideas which with the experience of in looking
on things ---" P.9, 11/12 Then Guth becomes exp. - (Kitten means fully awakened, other-

1965

Eccles, Sir John[#] The Brain and the Unity of Conscious Experience
The 19th Arthur Stanley Eddington Memorial Lecture 19. Oct. 1965
Cambridge, at the University Press. (great Britain) -

[#] Professor of Physiology, Australian National University, Canberra. -

Foreword by W.H. Thorpe and W.B. Harland: "... man's meagrely increasing control over natural forces holds out prospects of material achievements that are dazzling; but under this increased control of material power can be detected by a ^{great} number of spiritual and spiritual values, it threatens the catastrophe head-on of a civilisation. Consequently, the need now more or less as never before for a synthesis of the kind of understanding to be gained through various ^{human} sciences, - scientific, philosophical and religious of early birth."

This lectureship was instituted in 1947 --- the donors aim to deal with some aspect of contemporary scientific thought considered in its bearing on the philosophy or on ethics. --- hope to maintain Eddington's concern for relating the scientific, the philosophical and the religious methods of seeking truth and will

Eccles, Sir John The Power and the Unity of Conscious Experience.

2.11/12 written also in parallel direction through by experiencing written - all every - thing first written all but doesn't exist in it - what a fine idea first written words normally to environment, and written but experienced, nothing, they little ones are all side - deep deep are other side produced by plan - First written always observed every side - and written 50/50 - Continued - active exploration is essential - for written and written! P. 13 - These experiences at depth that, as a consequence of active or trial - and - over learning, the basic unity observed by conscious information from the active are in the front as that they give a real picture of the external world that is derived by touch and movement i.e. the world of visual perception becomes a world in which is confronted with the world of active perception becoming. - this perceptual world is in which when against - from "participative becoming" - the perceptual world is in which when against - the that we in depth; it normally shows itself at the time the images are the best in the world. - Investigative inf. + sensory inf. from most modern experimental = synthesised with retained inf. - if not possible - good idea here is →

divided with 2 separate groups. - of animal trained before operating, several
 behavioural conflict. Some conflict if monkeys were trained in opposite directions with
 originally in training together. Rivest et al. (1987) - also explain 2 human subjects involved. -
 (1964, 1965, Spring) Here's a bit of the story 65!! Mind not? (3m Roman + Cerebral experience -
 Escalade Ed. Title of sp. article "Hemispheric interaction - the mind - brain problem" - the other side is the
 "The Great Unknown Communication" in the Scientific American (1967) - P. 98. They are not the
 at all applied to the left visual field, survive with cytoplastology, but with-
 out being able to give an account of what it they are doing. If unimpeded,
 they do not know what the left side is doing. - Often, they try to control left hand with
 right hand. - P. 30 diff. divided brain power left to each hemisphere - observe
 in each hand, subjects aware that simultaneously and differently, all things
 appeared to each hemisphere. - (Escalade studies minor electric shock - right -
 monitor like a car with without observation, P. 31) - Understanding the problem of
 power. - Experimental control of left hand allows intervention to subject. - Right
 hand may interfere with right hemisphere of left hand, for which it doesn't
 know the solution. - minor hemisphere does complex activities like of it even. -
 5 points also to minor h. brain observation, but no language. Escalade: No communication!

Engelhardt, H. Tristram Jr.

The Roots of Science + Ethics

1976

Hostings Center Report, 6 (June 76): 35-38

P. 35 (Engelhardt - 1950's - 1960's - 1971) argue that science + ethics are interrelated and are the other: ethics will necessarily influence and reassess decisions made. But it is absurd to the point of the questioning moral and science being in opposition form, and as a process in irreversible but ethic of the element of truth. - For well after a small or medium jump at the threshold of society ethics and the life sciences have been acknowledging the truth, "The Foundations of Ethics and its relationship to the Life Sciences." Under a great form the retained fundament for the Humanities. Recent concepts of ethics have been arrived at turns of how they affect all ideas of the science. In this conference originally, philosophers, physicians + biologists were attempted to stretch the conceptual boundaries involving ethics + the science. - The conclusions of the past year of this ongoing discussion. Learn, at least in part, what is the humanist's concern in the science, what all human distinction, is needed in + differs upon basic value judgments concerning methods + the world. The conclusions appeared in the 17 essays + commentaries of the volume Science, Ethics + Medicine (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.

Daniel Callahan, ed. (Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Institute of Society, Ethics + the Life Sciences, 1976), which separates the first (P. 36) part of the first year labor, roughly, they see; (1) the image + interpretation of ethics are about borrowed from and influenced by them of science + knowledge. — (2) The sciences, in particular, these activities being on the human condition, are structured 'by value judge-ments concerning what human should be like and should be able to do.

(3) Science + ethics, though are separately distinguishable, are in part inseparable due to a web of interdependent concepts + ideas, (4) It is necessary to place the activities of science within the human world of human activities in general, (5) Ethics, in order to provide conduct successfully in this world must be attention to the fundamental of the empirical sciences. — (6) The first part's discussion stressed biology as a medicine. — --- biological things have among them the basis of ethical, social and political thought. — P. 37 Man - perceiving about himself - is both learned by and escapes from the constraints of his biological nature. --- The discussion while he continued in the final three years of his research groups and will be collected in each year's volume of papers. Each volume should provide a map of many faces and

Feigl, Herbert - The "Mental" and the "Physical".

Postscript →

1958
1967

University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1958 / 1967

You the great script - prepare (P. vii) Feigl talks about "second and third thoughts" as well as "greater awakenings" - on the Identity Theory. -

(This is a book of Sperry's with plenty of references underlined by Sperry.)

? P. 6. - Reductionist physicalism (positivism, behaviorism, logical behaviorism, operationalism) is fundamentally going out of fashion (???) (I thought, Feigl was a reductionist ??) - P. 7 "interactionism" as well as parallelism is of course a form of dualism. - // Vitalists or interactionists like Dingle, Mc-Donnell, J. D. Pratt, Dineen, Kravitz, et al. hold that biological concepts and phenomena are irreducible to the laws of physics, and hence - in positivism - these psychological concepts + laws are irreducible. Meanwhile, this ~~settled~~ doctrine is combined with a theory of the emergent nature of life and mind, (that + the individual Sperry was part of! Read one author, - dialogue with Sperry's last paper!)

P. 8 It is logically conceivable that biological, psychological, and social phenomena

(as well as their regularities) may not be explainable in terms of those physical or physico chemical laws (and theoretical assumptions) which are sufficient for the explanation and prediction of inorganic phenomena (and their regularities). - Physical parallels to such irreducibilities are clearly evident even within physics. The "mechanistic" (Newtonian) premises of explanation are more viewed as entirely insufficient for the explanation of electromagnetic radiation, of the dynamics of intra-molecular and intra-atomic processes, and of the interaction of electromagnetic radiation and the particles of matter. Nineteenth century physics adopted the fundamentally new concepts and laws of electro-magnetism; and these in turn were drastically modified and supplemented by the relativity and quantum theories of our century. It is conceivable that the phenomena of life and mind, - contemporary architects, biologists, vitalists, emergentists, interactionists, or parallelists, maintain that and on enrichment of the conceptual system of science will be indispensable. Their arguments are based primarily on the traditional compelling evidence of teleological processes, purposive

Feigl, Herbert - "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'":

(2)

1958
(1967)

behavior (P.S.), psychosomatics, and the mnemonic and intentional features of perception, cognition, thought, desire, and volition. And some arguments by new paradigmatic arguments point simply to the existence (occurrence) of mental events experience, i.e. the some feels or heard events of the directly given. They maintain that these events, though related to the mind and neurophysiological processes, are not reducible to, or definable in terms of purely physical concepts; and that their occurrence is not predictable or explicable on the basis of physical laws + physical descriptions only. (That must be Spinoza's view.) - At this point the distinction between the scientific and the philosophical objects of the mind-body problem becomes important. "The availability of many more non-reducibility forms a specified set of features; but in other contexts it may mean non-reducibility (in a systematic, non-equivalent way in the logical sense). We illustrate: many physical phenomena of sound or heat are derivable from the scientific theory of molecular motion. On this some certain parts of acoustics and of thermodynamics are reducible to mechanics, with or with-

degree of approximation at least within a certain limited range of the amount of phenomena. But the preponderance of best description (and similarly those of optics, electricity, magnetism, and chemistry) are not suitable for mechanics. Platonic speculation maintained that the laws pertaining to the motion of celestial in living organisms differ fundamentally from the laws of electrons in the context of inorganic life forms. In a similar vein the physiologist E. S. Sasser (1919, 1920, 1921), following some suggestions contained in Bergson's views on organic life and meaning, regarded the physical laws as special or limiting cases of biological laws. This is a drastic reversal of the "Victorian" attitude according to which mechanics - mechanism are (naturally) explicable in terms of basic micro-laws. (More exp. to explain all this.) - - // As a student of the living and the methodology of modern science, and impressed as I am with the recent advances in biochemistry, biochemistry, and neurophysiology, I am inclined to believe strongly in the fruitfulness of the physico-chemical sciences for problems (involving micro-explanations) for biology + psychology. But I am an old-fashioned philosopher and intellectual conscience demands that I do not judge the issues of scientificity (explainability) in an arbitrary manner. - -

Feigl, Herbert - "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'" (3)

1958

P. 9 - Along empirical lines I believe there are differences, in principle capable of test, between parallelism and interactionism (and for emergenceism) - - Rio Bay "physical determinism" I believe, of course, that degrees of freedom and aperiodic in - formation - predictability that even medium quantum physics would allow or require the means - and some of the uncertainty in organisms, - - of emergence is not required for the phenomenon of organic life; "physical" would mean those concepts and laws sufficient for the explanation of inorganic or well on of biological phenomena. This concept = 'physical' vs. "physical" = "scientific" = account of aperiodic - time - causal world (I don't see the diff.) - - the concept of mental states might well be physical; concepts, in that they could be introduced on the basis of the intersubjectual object relation - language of common life (I agree). Just on the concept of the metaphysical, and not denoting anything directly observable, can be introduced with the help of parables + correspondence rules - - the emergence ^{thesis} emergence ^{thesis} concept and really needed (e.g. vitalism) -

Feigl discusses Physical & mental sufficient - But, leaving observational evidence aside -
 again, but doesn't consider emergence or interrelationships scientifically meaningful. -
Empirically testable diff. between interactionism + emergence (underlined by Spang)
 on one hand - parallelism on the other Spang (Interactionism = causal relations between
 mental & physical) Example: Pong distracting bilateral ball game. - But ~~the~~ theory of emergence
 avoid on the one suggested, though not definitely understood by Mehl + Sellars (2021), is
 confirmable in principle by showing that physical determinism does not
hold (underlined + ? by Spang) -- -- on the following "I'm getting mixed up
 with physical and physical terms. -- P. B. - much depends on this is all upon
 just how the "interactions" or the "emergence" are conceived. - Mehl + Sellars
 emergence: "There, we have no interacting things or substances, but scientific
 pre-conditions interrelated (underlined by Spang) -- -- once mental states become unstable, then
 new awareness is imposed to alter the functional relations between the
 neurophysiological. (Physical 2) in a manner we anticipate ourselves to complete
 interaction (all underlined by Sp.) While any (scientific) predictions are completely in un-
 possible with this inferences + principal environmental (underlined by Sp.) & consider it scientifically
 meaningless - I place my bets in "victorious" observation, but could be wrong. -
 important states may be described to others ^{by themselves} even if incoherent to direct
 comparison

P. 13

comparison

Foigt, Herbert - "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical' (4)

1958

P. 14 - (P. 14 - ^{empirical scientific} Between parallelism + interactionism, because logical relations or functional dependencies are the modern scientific equivalent of cause-effect relations. Temporal association, he maintains, is not a criterion of causal connection. - P. 15 The geometrical axioms underlying the free will philosophy, taking a considerable in philosophy, have been brilliant-ly exposed by empiricist philosophers. (understand, by Sp.) - E.g. A. E. Huxley (1881) - P. 16 These could be explained as causal by means of other mental and only correlated with mental states (or - mental states themselves need not be causal.) - P. 17 - 'Individualist explanations = just facts. That's just it. - Cartesianism or theory of evolution couldn't be predicted either, because this program, - still, we must know an explanation. - 1) Cognition against mind-brain interaction because it's only subjectively experiencing (2) - P. 18 - Scientifically speaking, the admission of subjective factors becomes they are unknown like the unknown cause of unknown. - (See Polanyi on that!) - If we include actionism or dualism, however, impossible are seemingly for mind-body, they have empirical content

and entail various limitations of the scope of physical & deterministic, interactionism is more difficult to (P. 19) formulate than by the one in the (1961-1962) emergence hypothesis. (Substances assigned for interactions) - No question of immaterial 'self' convincing. - Self = more or less stable structure of dispositions due to some constitutive ability inhibited, neutralizing + environmental ontology model, and eventually upon latest structure of organism (exp. N.S. + evidence against). - Or interaction would suppose something arising instead of free will problem, or for an account of the causal efficacy of mental events in the course of behavior. - M + S. emergence makes sense, but many not be needed for exp. of behavior. - Some evidence of some fields not a good reason for building emergence doctrine. - P. 46 Given in inorganic matter than we were on the environment modifications (E. Herwig, Senner, + Pollack says about the immune) (?) a general property of all organic matter of dispositive potentials which can be affected by means in which. Certain features of electricity and of magnetic properties the immune in this sense. - P. 47 unavoidably connected with behavior and the greatest philosophy in the doctrine of intelligences about making so (a self) - of the still certain without significance of "or - formic molecule" and of emergent novelty have constituted a great

Feyl, Herbert - The "Mental" and the "Physical" (5)

deal to the clarification of the idea, -- in modern natural science no sharp distinction can be made between accidents (as in the Cartesian i.e. re-torial addition of forces or velocity) and emergents. On the explanation of the proper-
 ties and the behaviour of compounds and not wholes we always need laws of compo-
 sition - be they as simple as the straight forward arithmetic addition of velocity,
 masses, electric charges, etc., or slightly more complicated as in vector addition
 (or just a little more involved as in the relativistic "addition" formula for ve-
 locity), or extremely complex as all the so far not fully formulated composition
 laws which would be required for the prediction of the behaviour of orga-
 nisms on the basis of a complete knowledge of their atomic structure and the dy-
 namics laws interrelating their component parts - can at present. - (Much of this mat-
 ter has been covered by J. Modern quantum physics, on a very basic level, belongs
 to the modern laws "organismic" character, as far as concerns the exclusion prin-
 ciple of W. Pauli (2 pg) which holds even for simple atoms. It is conceivable
 that much of what is called "emergent novelty" in the chemical and bio-
 logical laws of complexity may actually be explained in terms of the

organisms as irreducible features of the levels of structure and mechanism of organisms and that given these basic levels, the only explanation (which scientists often take for granted like "obvious features") are simply the postulates and theorems of geometry and kinematics. This is indeed very odd, admittedly using our speculative powers; that is to say, I believe that the pre-formation of voluntarily is able to explain the facts and self-organization of organic chemistry (i.e. of non-living but complex compounds) it will in principle also be capable of explaining the facts and self-organization of organic life. But we will later whether these conjectures prove correct or incorrect, emerge naturally from at least on a mathematical point of view simply means the impossibility of the derivation of the laws of complex ("wholes") from the laws that are sufficient to predict and explain the behavior of their constituents in relative isolation, (much of this is embodied by Sperry.) Thus the laws that are sufficient to account for the motion of free electrons (on a classical way, and then moving electronic or magnetic fields) are clearly insufficient to account for the behavior of electrons exhibiting the characteristics of atoms. - It stands to reason that in order to "save" (i.e. to maintain) the laws of nature, scientists can't afford to stop there in investigations on a very low level of complexity. - Now some may wonder why in that form such a very low level of complexity would be higher

Engel, Herbert - The "Mental" and the "Physical" - (6)

1958

to higher complexities of many degrees, we make physical laws (but only some - those comparisons laws are reversed.) (indicated + marked by Sperry.)

If we know even that the nervous, biological, holistic, and emergent between law not adequate as criteria of mentality, because these features characterize them in organic structures and processes. "We know no concern by most biologists, however, refers to the reductionally results and the (physical a) within volatility of activities at or below this. The whole is in the first time again upon the existence of subjective experience. - P.49 + After explaining of seeing for first time above, if we had ever been seen before - we couldn't predict the mental experience - even though we might know about all neuronal events involved. - "I conclude that the author's failure of the mind-body problem is the logical outcome of the correlation laws concerning brain and physical processes. (mentioned in addition to some facts.) P.50 - Here, he uses the word "simplex mind" - but, "I think, in a diff. sense than Sperry (line 4) - answers the impossible without explanation or imaging. - The problem is one of physical availability or irreducibility of informational terms to the language of reduction

an ultra-physical description. - P. 51 ∴ intuitionality not point of passage -
 physical but rather point of passage - logical problem. - P. 52 Mind-Body Identity
 with transition to all new points... without among points & laws with various details. -
 P. 54. - It seems now that, however, that among the objects and processes describable in
 physical terms, there are differences at least of degree (after of which can in principle degree) just
 of a fundamental, qualitative or quantitative type, as between the structure and
 the dynamics of proteins, atoms, molecules, genes, viruses and molecules and with
 cellular organisms, the transitions differences between, e.g., a simple inorganic
structure and a human being are therefore not in the least denied. - Physical
 can be described with the interests of each nation born. - Has operative-therapeutic
 could structure. Fundamental picture of our world. - It scarcely needs to be said or
 magnetic fields, atoms and electrons, as the secret thoughts of other persons. -
 (There's "observable by direct perception") - although we say: "I could see him
 disappeared he had." (by inference). - → Phenomenon-field description. [The
 third's Polanyi's "tacit knowledge."] - P. 56 - "Of something is 'nothing in the mind' - that
 means that it is not directly describable by sensory observation. - But can be talked
 about by those who know them, even be influenced by talking (as sticks + stones
 convert) + talking to minds can lead to action. - P. 57 Intelligence can be described
 in physical terms - without activities, in other words. - It can state of classical

Foyle, Herbert - The "Mental" and the "Physical"

(17)

1958

P. 57 the words names forms are real, and the concepts of statistical or methodological ones -
deserve (in terms of which there is a fundamental difference, with certain modifications,
can be defined from a "higher" level. The concepts of another behaviour theory are related
analysing by the state of the higher level of neurophysiology; and as on statistical level -
analysis, - the concepts of the various fields of scientific theories. - P. 58 - identical terms of
physiology & language (i.e. of the atomic and molecular theories). - (e.g. the electric -
magnetic field of Jupiter is a physical & atom described in physics; language, however, can
also be described in physics & theoretical language) - ^{unsubstantiated} ~~it is not~~ the outcome of the
analysis - both problems have been shown to this: also the concepts of inter-specific pairs -
being - relating to phenomena other or phenomena other fields - definable on the basis of physics,
theoretical terms, and if so, are they also definable on the basis of physics & theoretical
terms? 1st question: matter of philosophical analysis - 2nd question: involved at
present must be decided affirmatively in future (E.g. language). - P. 59 Mental states
are important. - P. 61 - epistemological subject has been it since the concept
of epistemology of error - Non-logical concepts = relations between concepts
which logically can be in other events with events which ex hypothesi are in

principle not intrinsically and independent by itself. (I object to
 the logic of the one! E.g. a vacuum - before physical laws for it were found -
 could not be used in logic connection with physical things - now it can - and
 with mind) -- No that's diff. - who is a broad form grasp! -- P. 68 - Reduction of
 logical holismism and of logical pluralism into the subject area of some sort
 of probabilistic doctrine. -- Organisms highly permeable: -- end of us humans live out of it of
 individual experience: and infer animals into it (direct investigation highest in mammals) -
 P. 69 - Correlation between mental + mental states to tell us humans -
 if we had completely adequate + detailed knowledge of the neural processes
 in human beings, and the knowledge of the one to see or at least one
 to know (P. 69 mind-body) correlation laws, then a description of a neural
 state would be completely sufficient (and genuine condition) for the
 occurrence of the corresponding mental state. - (Involvement by G. 69) - P. 71
Reduction + Identification in Scientific Theories: In order to decide whether
 the mental and the physical can in some sense be identified, it is in the
 principle to cast a light on brief glance at the logic of identification + identifica-
 tion in the sciences, esp. in physics, biology, and psychology -- The ad-
 vance of scientific theories consists essentially in the reduction of a number of
 original heterogeneous facts and alleged entities to a unitary set of explanatory-
 the

Foyle, Herbert - the "Newton" and the "Physicist"

(8)

1958

P. 71 - Micros + fast photo (understand by Sperry). - O, O, visible light is electric negative radiation, falls out in NaCl etc. (negative ion = an aggregate of even atoms with a characteristic spin of certain of their electrons, etc.) Smart change meaning because are understanding circuits in cerebral cell assemblies, etc. - "co" + "one" represent identification

P. 72 Simply one and same individual (or universal) making these different objects (by the object! Mental experience + ever-changing circuit are 2 diff things -- maybe a diff aspect of one event - but not same thing!) -- or described by diff. Observer - fourth dimension (that's more like it, that's possible! - e.g. perhaps we are within a situation of continuous small cells + objects are normal + bound, --) P. 77 when, e.g. the psychiatric phenomena parallel when still undisturbed, the "divine entity" ground processes are concerned on the consecutive factor which "produces" the various symptoms of that disease. The examples of this act could be multiplied in definitely from all the sciences. - \therefore ground process = (identical with) breath + group tone (or symptoms identical with a) presence of bacteria + b) general process. It can be explained either by confront or by causate entity. - Same with mind + breath. - \therefore breath identical - P. 78: Conceptual normal behavior through like belief strength, expectancy, desire, instinct, memory trace, attention, compassion, etc., may not be identified in a future psycho-physiology with specific types of normal

- structure - And - process - pattern - , // Neuropsychological identification of all of record not possible
 Question "intentional acts" at perception, value objective assessment, expectation, thought, belief, doubt,
 Moral position, motivation, etc. fall on the one hand under the category of the logical rather than the
 psychological. - On the other hand, they are identical with physical occurrences in the brain. - P. 79
 cross of mind body problem cannot be in the interpretation of the relation between mind-body and
 mental processes. - // the identity thesis -- asserts that the states of direct experience --- are identical
 with certain (parameterizing configurational) aspects of the neural patterns in their proper
 manner. // - "in to brain can, then in the "double hermeneutic" thing held by many modern
 scientific critical minds. (P. 14. Sellars + some W. G. F. R. here described their historic double-
 hermeneutic with a double hermeneutic of a descriptive of a descriptive (Black!) (all this under-
 lined by Sperry.) P. 80 Some modern natural scientists, some feel = language of the operations;
 i.e., neuropsychological language = double - language thing = identity thing (underlined by Sperry)
 (most better language will not be as double -- double language better) P. 80/81 After nice
 description explained by neuropsychological events (some free language accepted now!) - P. 81/82
 Good arguments for accepting objective evidence. - I double aspect thing suggested because it
 involves an unknown. P. 84 Kant said obviously that experienced content is the thing-in-itself
 which corresponds to the thing proper - as known in the object - transparent - cannot grasp
 at natural science. - Here, very reasonable view! Paraphrase (all nature conscious) me! - Evaluate with
 human thought + feeling - Me! (Under this known with mind from problem - in which case this, nature
 known.) - P. 85 Objects such as experience? - No! A bell, by reflecting light, producing sound
 waves, and being a solid, itself having effects on atoms, on cells, and on tactile sense
 endings = causal thing of perception as much as designed by phenomena.

dimensional systematic observations described. - This shows that there are underlying still dis-
 tinctness for which we cannot make empirical test could be designed. - P. 98 Derived by the ad-
 mittedly themselves in part from of the individual basis for the knowledge elements, ^{positions} ~~positions~~
 have abstractly reflected the very objects of these knowledge elements. If there are some
 questions for which to have not found even more yet - maybe others can take them up
 if we were interested in continuing evidence in this field there knowing what the best
 would about it! (What's good! Compare that with Sperry's 'other kinds' - 'I like that (Sperry)')
 P. 107 Experiments like 17-9 - 6-53-12 could be learned by children which would only
 tell for mental terms like: "Tense - in position - differential" - "not happily - experienced" and
if the child then later should understand it, it would be not as favorable with identity
theory - considerable change of meaning of original terms - but concepts irrelevant;
is certainly in accord with that one!! - (P. 89 Feigl went to win again on metaphysical
 with which a person could observe on a given the occurrence in his own brains which
 correlate with mental experience, - e.g. anger, etc. - P. 105 No testable diff. between identity theory
 + mind-body parallelism. P. 106 ... it is precisely one of the advantages of the identity
 theory that it removes the duality of 2 sets of correlated events, and explains it by
 the much less puzzling duality of 2 ways of knowing the same event - one direct,
 the other indirect. - If mental terms directly experienced - and the same terms experienced in
 neuronal patterns ~~that~~ (can through outersense on action) ~~that~~ is simply a correlation between
 patterns in 2 phenomena ~~these~~, fields. - P. 107 - identity theory shows with the understanding
 the belief that the brain basis of the mind can be dispensed. -

Feigl, Herbert - "The 'Mental', and the 'Physical'"

(19)

P. 86

One cannot even use expressions the mental only (that's my words, Feigl expresses himself more complicated) which we have to accept as reality. He postulates then (according to other experience) the physical which is independent of us. - P. 87 Feigl proves himself by comparing with good sense of human - the identity of "some feel" with the latter. - (Heck that with Spinoza's functional explanations!) - P. 88 we have to beware of believing the literally and visual evidence for "unconscious outside" things; e.g. Alarms, or signs - if we do, we can't understand mind-body identity thing (all my numbers) P. 90 Only the correct account of the ~~past~~ identification is a matter for the future position of ~~the~~ psychology. Logical idealism. P. 92 my data must be determined by a future system, but by the present system - ideal - "What is there?" Phenomenal descriptions appear like a future event in my life concerning any current body motion, because in the course of assessing the effects of any one body motion upon another, significant information of past events or future events is related by previous experiences now. - P. 95 - Again good reasons for holding mental + physical events to be other. - P. 97 The only evidence we can have for the causation of causal connections must be observed regularities. - No test for causal necessity over and above the tests for regularity. - Distinction between causal and providential + meaning

Engel & Harshbarger - Postscript after 10 years

(11)

The arguments from the "control efficacy" of pleasure, displeasure, attention, vigilance, desire, and volition, which the parent-ling New-Cartesian (Purser, etc.) keeps waving for under determinism, do not - I think - support the identity theory. (P. 140)

The formation of a certain set of ideas plus a significant elaborated (a more or less mid-level brownish feeling could not be described as to its quality, comparison, how, etc.) P. 141

Rule "Concepts of mind" - no longer applicable! (P. 142) More strongly than ever before, I am convinced that it is principally the concept of the "physical" that blocks misinterpretation and misunderstanding - P. 144/145

For many years I explored materialism, including that it is physically reductionist. -- equipped with their positivistic sort of "obvious" they throw doubt over the standard idea "matter" or physical events + processes. -- Point the very possibility of giving a complete physical account of the mind is just that attributing cond. law-like contingent but deterministic features of the universe and man's place in it that the reducing science model misinterpreting phenomena. Nothing is "explained away"

- everything is merely being overemphasized by a chauvinism in our distinct system, our matter-like rationalism its physical concepts being so. - P. 145 - foundational features of our world cannot be explained by mere phenomena, conditions + explanatory physical concepts. -

P. 148 - 35 years ago, in the highlight of patriarchy, it would seem that the reasoning of purely philosophical theory is intuitive + non-cognitive. -- P. 149. & no longer hold this view. The obvious like in the "mechanics" of all our empirical concepts being definitively pushed a cognitive functions -- philosophical discussions of nonintuitive direct experience, the moral faith claims, even if their truth is not established by criteria in the moral sense. -- The most basic moral problems! -- no, etc. -- they represent the extreme level of cognition; they contribute, as witnessed, to "dynamic" and "highly important, sort of knowledge." Nevertheless, they are the "intimate" basis of all our disciplined knowledge claims. -- deduct of direct experience provide the ultimate confirming or disconfirming evidence of all our postulated knowledge. -- "while a needed no longer special strictly of 'causality'." -- P. 150 & agree with Solomon W. in considering clearly intentional features as more observable than physicalistic description. -- on a par with objective reliability of logical coherence the psychological or physicalistic features. -- P. 151 the "intuitive feeling" (i.e., the alleged influence from "is" to "ought") is an important example of the conceptual confusion. P. 152 (Intentionality = sapience. ~~Let sentence - or subject~~ intentionality = character - thinking 'I have' something) that's what he means all the time with intentionality. --

See notes to Explain Physical 1 + 2 !!!

Feigl, Herbert - "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'"

(10)

1958

P. 113/114. 'I also expect that future scientific research will demonstrate the sufficiency of physical & explanatory. But if I should be wrong in that, a theory in which physical phenomena would seem to be a much more plausible alternative than dualism!'

materialism. ... The validity of the reductio theory falls in any case under the jurisdiction of future empirical research. - P. 115 Feigl now suggests that although dualism and reductionism might not be that in all cases we would stand the same scientific position when we are there any other persons ... and Sperry insisted that on the one hand! It is essential part of the justification of the philosophical assumptions proposed in this essay depends upon empirical, scientific assumptions. Only the future development of psychology will decide whether these assumptions are true. ... I cannot adequately estimate psychology's present hypotheses. Nor did I intend to close the doors to alternative philosophical views of the relations of the mental to the physical. (That's a quest! 'I really like his attitude!') -- what if did try to show, however, in that manner is (i) still very plausible on scientific grounds, (2) philosophically defendable in that it involves no insurmountable logical or epistemological difficulties and paradoxes. -

1967

Post script after 10 years - desired overland of stimulating difficulties -

grateful for these widely differing approaches - From almost complete agreement to no -

virtual continuation of destructive criticism - Can't deal with all, despite myself the

most important, there are new approaches now in the making of policy understand them - 1957 many more

approaches to the great problem in making policies, (Feigl p. 137 was part of German

until 1984 - 30 - where himself must bring problem was a problem understand by the most

expert scientists.) He was up - was against it, - No change line of observation the

same good science + elemental philosophy - Every major scientific achievement in

modern history is an elemental philosophy; and even philosophy in modern times

and is not subject subject to the problems and limits of the other is - to put it

under the microscope impartially, if not impossible - P. 138 Feigl even dis-

agrees with Smart, Frankfurt, etc. (United Front of epistemological criticisms the

tradition has shown that "in principle " a physical description of the world is im-

possible (because not repeating) - "What about immediate experience in the lab ? - Feigl "My

own picture of physical science - Feigl discovered problems with Verification was and "telling

if it is worth for this intentional communication (the world should be making but a pile of debt ;

(Einstein spoke German and used a rather unclear word ! (Schwarz of course !) :- was nothing

and important task for identity theory !! (Molecularists are clearly wrong - for them, the most in-

formation thing is not them ! - (Question of immediate experience) Talk about in inconsistency !

Feigl, Herbert - Postscript after 10 years

(1967)

1967

Analogously, the much-discussed problems of the "nature of a person, of the "unity of consciousness", of the "identity of the self", and perhaps even of Kant's "synthetic unity of apperception" cannot be asked on a purely phenomenological basis. (Marshall D. Spiegel). (Never find a logical setting needed.) P. 154 Phenomenism is new and ~~it~~ still is and will probably never put many of these on an even footing. As well as explaining and providing power. (Methodical Phenomenism - not beyond it. - which depends on mechanism.) -- (Again: the main part of the - the fact in everyday life - but basically in itself - inconsistent. & Socially limited in explaining + understanding phenomena) -- As seen on the phenomenalist (P. 155) type of Phenomenism (as for example, in the understanding words and their constitution of D.F. Skinner) is accepted by them as about the central states and processes within the organism, and especially in its nervous system, it is on its way to the kind of physicalism which forms the former important of the present philosophy of science, - which suggests in this "great turning point" in the development of man (or all)

Example of behaviorist - materialistic view -

concept of the alipratic (egocentric) perspective as well as of the manifest image (still enmeshed with subjective pictures) but a completely alternative account. --- the radical opposition appears clear to the experienced painter ("zero and plus") of time; the difference between past, present, and future; the "preparatory" description of human action; the "intentional" notion of cause; the value-implications of action; of moral responsibility, freedom, and the "act". For again, nothing is "a-priori" among "detached" objective phenomena. -- (But also): egocentric account can't be anything directly, scientific accounts are indirectly. -- F. 156 & argue that in the world of everyday life we understand each other quite well, even though the linguistic side of the "manifest image" is, strictly speaking, incoherent. F. 158 & not as the descriptive or re-descriptive notions of the egocentric ~~theoretical~~ description of the operable in the ~~inter-subjective~~ inter-subjective of the physical picture and the "epistemic" view were not completely as the directly or indirectly and the "epistemic" epistemic terms disappear in the inter-subjective account of the physical epistemic option. And just as it is clear (if not perhaps obvious) to use "where" and the epistemic in the behaviour description? as the operational

Fritz Hehlant - Participant after 10 years

[13]

1967

P. 158

"How are the experienced subjects' gradations in the ^{scientific} ~~attitudinal~~ descriptions of the world?" is especially inappropriate. These phenomenal gradations are, of course, but in a thoroughly different way, in the "transformed" concepts of naive subjects as in P. 159. Fortunately, the most promising endeavors in current theoretical psychology focus the attention to the "ordinary language philosophy of mind."

-- The ordinary language approach, though often phenomenologically descriptive, is fraught with the dangers of a regression to the art of common sense psychology which is criticized in the "intuitive psychological misunderstanding" that only reason of some experienced persons can grasp. Who is the "psychology" model spirit effectively in the practical affairs of diplomats, ministers, politicians, business-men, parents, individuals, and individuals. -- // The art of necessary that concerns of, and answers for, political states in other persons is, I have always admitted, an extreme and deliberate form of analogical reasoning. // To criticize the as perfectly meaningless. // If future scientific research should lead to the adoption of one or more P. 160 form of enlightenment for - heraldic doctrine - the scientific intuitionism), there must of my expectations will be withdrawn.

Feigl: Herbert - Mind-body, not a pseudo - problem

(~~1952~~?)
earlier!
1961

Ans: Boist - mind/body identity theory. -

P.41 - "I conclude that the mind-body problem is not a pseudo - problem."

P.40 - "I am indeed in agreement with one modern line of theoretical materialism in that I assume that the basic layer of the universe are the physical ones. But this does not commit me in the least as to the nature of the reality where mental entities are formulated in the physical layer. When reality is known to us by acquaintance only in the case of our direct experience which, according to my view, is the subject area of certain neurophysiological concepts. - P.41 "Does the identity theory simplify our conceptions of the mind? I think it does. Instead of conceiving of a medium or a circuit - to - type of events, we shall only see reality which is represented in 2 diff. conceptual systems" - "physics + phenomenological psychology" - ... results of comprehensive reflection on results of science as well as on basic + spiritual values of scientific method. - ... P.75 - Feigl believes in identical physicalism - (?)

See: Wakes to explain physical 1 and physical 2!

1974

Ferguson, Esmond Silas - The Singularity of Man: The Origin and Evolution of Consciousness. Publ. Esmond F. Ferguson, 606 Sunset Road, Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 - 1974

Ref. to Sperry: Neurology and the Mind-Brain Problem.

Author thought in 1919 that mind-brain problem was found in neural electrical impulses. Found scientific explanation 33 years later. It took another 22 years to get it published. (by himself!) (Author: Investment manager).

Universe a series of levels with different laws at each level.

P. 94 - The problem of consciousness has returned to a respectable subject of academic discussion. For several decades after World War I it was banned. . .

Ref. to Sperry: Mind, Brain, and Humanist Values. (Author differs with Sperry on understanding of "consciousness". F. differentiates between "perceptual" brain (in animals) and "conceptual" brain in man - mostly left hemisphere. There is no content of consciousness that is

not learned. --P.134 The phonemic code became the basis for the humanization process, the origin of "consciousness" and the creation of a new order of being to be contrasted with "matter" and "life", namely "mind", and expressed in a cultural order. - Very primitive in hunting societies. "Self-consciousness" arose only during transformation of hunting pack into an ordered society (P.135) -

Sperry, Brain Bisection and Consciousness. (Ref.)

P. 194 "Ethical consciousness" occurred when gods were not seen like small tribal relatives who could be bribed with favours, but it was recognized that "ethical standards" were required, to which members of larger organizations must comply for survival of the entire larger community of man. (Hammurabi, ~~Yeha~~, etc.) P. 210 Rational Consciousness started with Socrates. Remarkable thing about the ancient Greeks was that they became so interested in natural phenomena that they tended to ignore traditional interpretations. (P.215)(P.218) New way of looking at things enlarged range of conscious experience. Greatly. Greece--turning point in evolution of humanity (p.230) - To break down custom by the sheer force of reflection...etc. (these are quotes from others). P.235 Autonomy of thought established. They were beginning to utilize an entirely different method. (P.236) - P.245 Critical consciousness - (After Alexander the Great, exhaustion of creative impulse.) - A brief flash of rationalism between 900 AD

1974.

(P.246) and 1200AD in Arabia. (esp. in mathematics and astronomy.) Unrestrained imaginative speculation in Europe. Ploughing increased agricultural output - population increase - many cities were built. Rationalism in Thomas Aquinas - but great superstition among population and nobles. Imminent end of earth expected - religion and "other world" thoughts dominated - no sense to waste time with this earth. Science in China remained empirical and restricted to theories of primitive and medieval type. Civilization too well established - converse in Europe (P.249). Critical consciousness based upon the awareness of the implications of the ordering of experience in all areas. Disciplined use of perception. (p.253) P.255 A change occurs if...when...for some reason or reasons, a people undergo exposure to broad new experiences. If they are too dissimilar to those which have been normal, a problem is created. If the diversity is broad enough and persists long enough, a new ordering of experience results. (This didn't happen in China). (There world remained "wholistic") not separated analytically, as in West. P. 262 - Efforts were, and still are, made to show that man is simply a more complex perceptual animal. Erroneous. Emergence of consciousness introduced a new vector. Possible for human to direct his activities with ref. to perceptual inf. along

channels which he created from conceptual constructs. Entire new means of adaptation over vast range of behavior possible. No other animal can do this. Man created new worlds, fictitious or not, which could come to dominate the utilization of perceptual inf. Neurophysiologists found basis for cultural evolution and personality development. (P.263). - Causes all previous and present work of psychologists and anthropologists to fall into place. P.264 Level of magic - lest we think this is a remote stage it is only necessary to peruse the daily paper and discover columns devoted to astrology! - Ethical Consciousness! Belief that it is possible to significantly influence future events toward acceptable social goals which are inherent in the nature of things. Rational Consciousness: Belief that logical statement can be set forth regarding ultimate reality. Even critical consciousness accepted various paradigms of science uncritically - until manner of how consciousness functions became known. - There is no method available for reaching an absolute belief. Quote (Sperry) P. 270 "All the ultimate aims and values could be profoundly affected by a thoroughgoing rational insight into the mind-body relationship". (Foregoing Chapters indicate such an insight.) Areas of impact of such a viewpoint? Environmental factors of most important consideration. Significant transition. Decline of Western civilization. Most significant failure "Absence of a world-view which sustains our value system." Loss of faith in idea of progress. Collapsed under events of past fifty years. Secularization of belief has

(P. 271) failed. (Same as in ancient Greece). Recent book "Where the Wasteland ends typical for crumbling of a society. Political activity conducted solely on an opportunistic basis. There is no recognition of any consciously accepted role to be played either domestically or internationally, except in a "populist" sense. There is no hard core thinking of long range goals or the discussion of basic principles of guidance. ... No serious intellectual effort apart from technology. Only basis for ~~motivation~~ persuasion to primary motivations. Art declined. No expression of some deeply felt striving for fulfillment within the universe. Staggering amounts of money spent on sports. Peak technological leadership of America masks failure in other regions. P.273 We have made certain assumptions as to our material and intellectual capabilities which may not prove to be correct. Lean years ahead will call for a radical change in our mode of administrative procedure. Fundamental problem: How society can be governed - no progress since Plato. "Something better than a hit-Or-miss relationship must be established between the knowledge amassed by scientists in a multitude of fields and the decision making processes of those who guide political action." (Armstrong). What is now required is a "control center" for the "body politic" similar to that of the brain for the body. ...overwhelming

The Aquarian Conspiracy - by Marilyn Ferguson -

J.P. Tarcher Inc. 9110 Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA. 90069
St. Martin's Press 175 Ave. New York, N.Y. 10010

- ① This book is much better than several other books on similar subjects I have read. These other books, published during the 60's and early 70's were far more irrational and violently anti-scientific. -- Again - as in science - it seems as if a convergence toward a scientific-humanistic vision is occurring, a vision apparent in your papers many years earlier. --

- ② This book is far more difficult than I at first expected. - In books of pure science, I can depend on solid peer-judgement before anything is printed. - Here, I have to judge myself, and it is far from easy. - // Whether Priegoire's "dissipative structures" or Pribram's holograms (even the multiple holograms he describes in Davidson's "The Psychology of Consciousness") have any application to the structure of the human brain - and how much - I can not say without further reading on the subject; Primary sources and criticism. - // I do not think that you would want me to spend time on these projects before the book on Consciousness is completed; or do you?

over -

③ Mandell's "Toward a Psychobiology of Transcendence: God in the Brain" in Davidson's "The Psychobiology of Consciousness" (1980) is extremely relevant to the understanding of Marilyn Ferguson's "The Aquarian Conspiracy". - Both authors talk essentially about the same subject, Mandell emphasizing: "Since transcendental experiences can be explained through brain states, they are insignificant," and Ferguson emphasizing: "Since transcendental ~~brain states~~ ^{experiences} can be explained through brain states, they are empirically validated." -

What has to be said is: "Even though transcendental experiences are emergents of brain states, their impact is, and must remain, of prime significance for our life." -

And this - as far as I understand you - is your point of view. -

P.S. It should be emphasized that the view of mind as ^{Q1} "emergent from" rather than "identical with" brain states directly encompasses the conviction that the mind is of superior importance and influence. -

Festinger, Leon, Clark A. Bunnman, Hiroshi Ono, and Donald R. Bamber

Efference and the Conscious Experience of Perception, Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. 74, #4, Part 2, August 1967.

Claim of reading: Does Festinger discuss functionalism?

Ref. the Spring 1952, and the Festinger + Cannon 1965 (I decided that, but it actually rather and ref. the Spring was Aug ref. the other papers by Festinger.) -

Abstract: A historical review of past attempts at formulating theories in which efference plays a role in conscious ~~experience~~ perception is presented. --- 4 experiments described. --- The results are consistent with the theoretical position that the efference + efferent readjustment account of visual input helps determine the visual perception of contours.

Historical Introduction: (Start with theories Charles R. Hamilton for comments criticizing and general Aristotane. -- Oswald Turek (1899 etc) paraphrases that underlie current views on the conscious experience of perception. -- F. B. Rose 1899 "Consciousness and Action only when the critical centers are healthy to do change to around the periphery." The same ref.)

However, attempt to specify what the intent of such a state of medication. - "Have
liberty? Sperry (1959) has also suggested such a view: (Quoted from P. 301) "... The presence
or absence of adaptive reactions, activities of this sort, leading to discharge into motor
patterns, makes the difference between perceiving and not perceiving." Sperry, however, is
one more specific than P. 301 at (1979) about this opposition, "We simply
make statements such as "... the preparation for response is the perception
(P. 301) and "... perception is basically an implicit sole reservation to the word."
and urges the possibility of such a theoretical approach. - "That's
all about Sperry - and there seems to be nothing on Functionalism." //

Feynman, Richard

1985

QED: Strange Theory of Light and Matter. Princeton, N.J. -- Princeton University Press

Electron obeys same rule + behavior as photon in 2-slit experiments -

Contents; Introduction. -- Photons: Particles of Light. -- Electrons and Their Interactions
Loose Ends.

(Main interest: Nature of Photons. -- Do they actually exist? -- Questioned by Dr. Sperry.)

Foreword: ... explanation of physics of small particles understandable to non-physicists.

Preface: Feynman looks at world, taking nothing for granted and always thinking things out for himself, often attaining new and profound understanding of nature's behavior. Acknowledgment: (Feynmann): Many "popular" expositions of science achieve apparent simplicity only by describing something different, something considerably distorted from what they claim to be describing. Respect for our subject did not permit us to do this. Through many hours of discussion we (he & his editor) have tried to achieve maximum clarity and simplicity without compromise by distortion of the truth.

Introduction: QED = quantum electro dynamics. Wellknown subject. Feynman loves it. Interaction of light and electrons. many phenomena synthesized into few theories. E.C. sound = motion of air. Heat too. Gravitation not yet understandable as something else. Light = electromagnetic wave (Maxwell). 1900 electron theory of matter. (Little charged particles in atoms, nucleus + electrons around.) -- P.5 Newton's laws failed to understand motion of electrons going round nucleus. Strange phenomena found. One had to lose one's

common sense to understand them. 1926 quantum mechanics discovered. Also explained fundamental chemistry (which is really physics), e.g. why an oxygen atom combines with 2 hydrogen atoms to make water etc. ((Very relevant to Sperry's theory of emergence.))

Thus, Q.M. = tremendous success. Maxwell's wave theory of light had to be changed to agree with Q.M. P.6 = So QED developed in 1929. -- Didn't work if accuracy was demanded (Conventionalized myth story - not quite correct). -- (He doesn't mention Planck and Einstein, jumps directly to his own research in 1948). -- Ascribes discovery of method that leaves no diff. between calculations and experiment to himself! -- Accuracy = to distance between 1.A. and New York, exact to width of a single hair! (That's the accuracy he introduced into Q.M.) QED describes vast range of phenomena. p.7. - No-one can understand Q.M. P.10. I can explain how nature works but not why it works in that peculiar way. You may not like how nature is and put a screen in front of your understanding. But not liking a theory is important, but whether it gives predictions which agree with experiments. Nature is absurd. (Interesting example of Mayan priests calculating astronomical details with dots and bars -- but faster than counting hundreds of beans). Relevance to Q.M. - P.13 Newton found that white light is a mixture of diff. colours, each of which can't^b separated further. Visible light just small sector of a large scale; sound too. Frequency = place on scale (ultraviolet light higher, upper end of visible). Infrared, lower. -- heat waves -- TV waves -- radio waves. QED extends over entire range. PHOTONS START HERE: Light is made (P.14) from particles. Very sensitive instruments make clicks shines on them. If light gets dimmer, clicks remain just as loud; there are just fewer of them. Each little lump of light = a photon. The human eye

Feynman: QED

- 2 -

1985

is a very good instrument: it takes only about 5 or 6 photons to activate a nerve cell and send a message to the brain. P.15. It is very important to know that light behaves like particles, esp. for those of you who have gone to school, where you were probably told something about light behaving like waves. P.17: Reflection on glass: 4% are reflected; 96% pass through glass. Why? We don't know. All methods to find out failed. That's just the way it is. And 4% is an average. We can not say which photon reflects, which goes through. Q.M. has to work with averages --- but it works well nevertheless. --- Thin layers of glass reflect less than thick layers. (If there are more than one surface). When layers are thicker, less reflection too. Most at a certain thickness!!! Thicker again, more again --- cycles! Average = 8%. --- Most 16 %. --- Explainable by wave theory. (More than 2 layers of glass; results differ again). --- But clicks prove that light is corpuscles!!! P.22/23. (Waves can combine or cancel out.). Puzzle was finally resolved. P.48, explained why you see colours when light shines on gratings. Diffraction patterns (It's scattered according to diff. wave lengths.) --- Lasers, holograms --- same principle.

FISHER, M.E.

Reinhard Lipowsky and Michael E. Fisher (Cornell University, New York)

1987

Scaling regimes and functional renormalizations for wetting transactions.

Physical Review B 36, 2126-2141.

(ED. BOOK)

Aim of reading: Fisher wrote in: Niels Bohr: Physics and the World (New Academic Publications, 1988) that QM is irrelevant in many macro-situations. Scaling --- Dimensionalities --- Specially modulated behavior --- Condensed matter physics --- Multi-faceted character of modern condensed matter physics. (Quantum vs. classical mech.) --- Does he say anything of the sort in his recent articles?

Article highly specialized and technical, full of difficult formulas. --- Abstract full of jargon; I don't know what he's talking about. --- Introduction: An interface is a domain wall or membrane. Constrained by external fields or other interfaces. Unbinding through thermal fluctuations, impurities, etc, --- Classes of unbinding phenomena described. (critical effects of wetting) --- Paper concerned with latter. (= unbinding of 2 interfaces.) --- The "Discussion and outlook" on pp. 2140-2141 is not much more enlightening.

6 children, eggs + beans (M.E.) on which column 1st
Am 71 Wm. EC vol. 70 (21) 227-238 (1988) HWWA

Fletcher, Joseph - Humanism and Theism in Bio-medical Ethics -

Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 31, 1 Autumn 1987 pp. 106-116

1987 Dr. Speng liked article + gave it to me to read, -

8. Principles: 1) consequential of biomedical centred values as a basis of biomedical ethics + an ethics based on divine command + supra natural sanctions. -- 2) consider ethics, esp. bio medical ethics, in addition to principles of bioethics as bio ethics expressed + entail into the American tradition. -- last quality of writing philosophy termed

from anthropology + linguistics to practical problems. - Principles are considered as being the primary ethical act of care - not prior to them. -- new idea + principles (p. 107)

ought to be survived generalizations, changeable when experience dictates; not rigid laws. -- Ethics = practice → theory → practice. - 1) Divine from the hospital as the laboratory, all about + generalized about table about ethics can be carried in unpleasant or inhuman and therefore unethical. - 11 (V. 1987) -- p. 108 the term "bioethics" includes ecology and from

human problems - not just medicine + biology. - Fletcher, Morals + Medicine, (1954). - at this time, Fletcher wrote a theological (Philosophers = Yohannes - and - Dr. J.)

Philosophers - people are always changing - keep these ethical and religious values in the heart (p. 109) they to stand like philosophers. -- The major contributions American to Philosophy is Pragmatism. - Case: Pragmatism and bioethics

contrast principles + ultimately categorical
 out - categorization in - one series!! -- values (P. 110) the truth is but the expected in our
 world of values! (rather retroactive than exposed! -- unwilling -- frustration & beard;
 for "good" + "retroactive" care principle = unwilling beard + well being. frustration & beard;
 1) theory about adaptation + theory of ethics + unwilling judgment. -- forms: a form that knows the
border reality + care for all upward & downward of interest beard dear to preparation
philosophers. He turns away from abstract critical + in offices forms medial adaptation
form but a primary medium, from fixed principles, closed against + retracted abstract +
living. -- the deed the object of the truth + receptive only truth (P. 111)
they accept the possibility + abstract of value + object of values only in the form.
opened to notion of fixed or abstract form = pre-scientific; fixed or abstract
values -- medial truth. -- if theory in good = descriptive values. -- ∴ (P. 111)
and problem when in only the order abstract values principles -- not to formulate
on these values form. -- human and this = not unambiguous. humanities + good o.c.
human and this = no good. -- So people there the religions. values must be seen
on values + Pr well being -- values exist abstract. -- ∴
human and this + Theism = anthropology of values. -- Greene: exploration of
human and this -- explained by abstract values. -- Socrates (Plato) --
human and this beard on human hypothetical + well-being. --

Fletcher, J.

Human Dignity + Theism in Bio medical Ethics

-2-

P. 112

My purpose: neither core P. humanism or theism, but the relationship of these diff. esp. P. Ethics. - Negative role of most religious in medical ethics, * - You will find - humanism or religious Michaelis -- Pragmatists don't assign value for the sake of themselves * (another abortion, petal in the north, to see the sun, center - caption, + medical genetic) -- Pragmatists; we ought to let the marriage the good - don't say what "the good" is, only what it's not. The standard. - But we need a standard human relationship. -- The true + good is what menas' -- (but) the what end? // Humanism: What menas' people is good, what our lives mean in evil. - Theism: 'with deeper than the world of good is good, what is better or better good is evil. - - Simple + obvious and mer' = Situational Ethics - Loving concern, or whatever better people, is God's will, most emotions condemn that. - 2 versions of theistic ethics: 1) Deontic (Dele 8.) Law of Nature = God's commanding + creating. Doctrine of Divine will is - needed in natural is still theism. - Theism does have logical consequences that living it will conflict with human dignity. - Humanism:

Protestant + Catholic etc. - Part 10 small etc. - claim that
 religious (not divine or ethical) basis of morality will be moral life +
 possible with it over + above these human or natural - → leads to greater goods,
 must pass through Christ, Christ - the Father doesn't object it either. - it was the
 human who starts education, morality, law, an administrative system, it was the
 divine + moral to solve human problems. - (P.114) Can ethics stand alone? - yes. -
 Progress in other areas the validity of. Also in law, science + ethics, by looking
 at the consequences, and it starts moral values in the process of human benefit. -
 it would have to reproduce in human and behavior, even if God created it. -
 P.115. - Human values are primary. - Religion demands our testimony, that we
 believe, - One human this side, not God's needs. - Right + wrong are human
 perceived, not objects of analysis. - case of infant born with spinal disease
 decision - program act: Most human choice. - A human can choose
 depends on medical knowledge, not on moral philosophy. - (P.116)
Fact and knowledge determine what ought to be done. Permitted by
Sperdy! → Narrow humanism. 1) Lacks hierarchical theory of values 2) Lacks
conscious evaluation 3) Can't see dualism in evaluation, humanism
 Fletcher's moralism: knowledge of pragmatism + human dualism. -
 Moral + value judgments are human of any + all of us, decision due to our knowledge of facts in
 given situation, not abstract principles.